A potential US-Iran ceasefire agreement risks failing because it may lack enforcement mechanisms that penalize either side for resuming hostilities, according to policy analysts examining the proposed terms.

The core problem centers on what negotiators omit rather than what they include. A durable ceasefire requires built-in consequences that trigger automatically if either party restarts military operations. Without such provisions, the agreement relies solely on good faith compliance, a fragile foundation in US-Iran relations marked by decades of mistrust and proxy conflicts.

Experts argue that effective enforcement demands reversible costs rather than permanent punitive measures. These could include graduated economic sanctions, military deployment restrictions, or trade suspensions that activate immediately upon treaty violation. The reversibility matters because it allows both sides to restore compliance without irreversible political damage that might trigger wider escalation.

The proposed agreement reportedly lacks specificity on verification mechanisms as well. Without clear protocols for monitoring weapons transfers, missile tests, or military movements, distinguishing between legitimate activities and treaty violations becomes nearly impossible. This ambiguity creates plausible deniability for both Washington and Tehran.

Historical precedent illustrates the danger. The Iran nuclear deal included verification provisions through international inspectors but failed to address broader regional military activity. When the Trump administration withdrew in 2018, the agreement collapsed without mechanisms to enforce continued Iranian compliance.

A stronger ceasefire framework would establish an independent monitoring body with access to military facilities and clear trigger points for escalating penalties. It would specify response timelines for alleged violations rather than leaving enforcement to diplomatic negotiations that often stall.

The stakes extend beyond bilateral relations. A weak ceasefire invites proxy actors, including militias in Iraq and Syria, to test boundaries through plausible deniability. Neither Washington nor Tehran may directly violate terms while their regional partners create conflict that destabilizes the entire framework.

Negotiators face pressure to conclude talks quickly,