Harvard Law professor Jack Goldsmith argues that the president lacks legal authority to fulfill a central commitment made in a proposed Iran memorandum of understanding. The pledge in question involves waiving sanctions against Iran, a step Goldsmith contends violates existing federal law.

Goldsmith's analysis, published on his Executive Functions blog, identifies a direct conflict between what the administration promised Iran and what Congress has authorized the president to do. Multiple statutes impose mandatory sanctions on Iran tied to its nuclear program and alleged state sponsorship of terrorism. These laws contain limited exceptions and generally require congressional action to remove or suspend penalties.

The legal constraint matters because it undermines negotiating credibility. If the U.S. government pledges sanction relief it cannot deliver without congressional approval, American negotiators lack leverage and Iran has reduced incentive to comply with any agreement. The gap between executive promise and executive power creates friction between the White House and Capitol Hill.

Congress has consistently expressed skepticism about Iran deals and has moved to restrict presidential discretion on sanctions. The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 requires congressional approval for any major agreement with Iran. More recent legislation has tightened sanctions architecture, leaving presidents with narrower room to maneuver through executive action alone.

Goldsmith's argument echoes a broader institutional tension. Presidents often negotiate commitments expecting to execute them unilaterally, only to discover that Congress has already constrained their power through prior legislation. The Iran sanctions regime represents one of the starkest examples of this dynamic.

The legal barrier does not necessarily kill negotiations. The administration could seek congressional legislation to authorize sanction waivers, but that path requires legislative support that remains uncertain. Alternatively, negotiators could structure agreements to require explicit congressional approval, though that approach reduces confidentiality and executive control.

The analysis underscores how separated powers complicate foreign policy. Even bipartisan legal constraints can create practical