The Washington Court of Appeals struck down an injunction that prohibited a man from mentioning his ex-wife and children online, ruling the restriction violated the First Amendment.
In Asbach v. Couto, a decision approved for publication this week, the court found that blanket orders barring someone from referring to family members in online media exceed constitutional bounds. Judge Bradley Maxa authored the opinion.
The case centers on a dispute in which a trial court had issued an injunction restricting what the defendant could say about his ex-wife and children across digital platforms. While courts routinely issue orders protecting parties from harassment or threats, the appeals panel determined this particular restriction went too far.
The court acknowledged that legitimate interests exist in protecting individuals from harmful speech, particularly in family law disputes. However, judges cannot suppress speech simply because it mentions specific people or discusses family matters. The First Amendment protects broad categories of expression, including statements about former spouses and relatives, absent specific threats or incitement.
The decision reflects tension between family law protections and free speech doctrine. Trial courts often craft injunctions to prevent ongoing conflict between separated parties, but appellate courts have increasingly scrutinized sweeping speech restrictions that extend beyond direct harassment or defamation.
Washington's appeals court joined other jurisdictions in rejecting categorical bans on naming individuals. Such orders must narrowly target actual harms like threats or repeated unwanted contact rather than simply silencing discussion about particular people.
The ruling carries implications for family law practitioners and judges drafting protective orders. Courts must tailor restrictions to address concrete injuries while respecting constitutional protections. A blanket prohibition on online mentions fails that test, the court concluded.
The decision does not shield defamation, true threats, or harassment. Speakers remain liable for false statements or intimidating conduct. The injunction at issue, however, prevented lawful speech about real people without requiring proof of harm beyond mere